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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of the case is accurately stated by
the Appellant and for that reason will not be restated
by Respondent.
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
Appellant's statement of the Disposition by the
Trial Court is substantially accurate and will not be
restated here.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The first and third paragraphs of Appellant's
statement of facts are reasonably correct. The second
paragraph is also accurate except for the first sentence thereof, and Respondent submits the following
statement in lieu thereof: "Appellant had prepared
1

an instrument on his stationery which is in evidenct
as Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 3A. The parties both
signed the instrument on February 12, and each considered it to constitute a part of the contract - tlic
remainder of which was attached thereto. (T 32)''
The equipment purchased \Vas itemized on B-I-F
quotation sheets. Printed on the bottom of the firnt
page appears in bold type: "Il\IIPORTANT READ
CAREFULLY." Then followed on the bottom of the
first page and on the back thereof: "Standard Terms
and Conditions of Sale."
The first paragraph of the Appellant's cover
letter states: "This is to be included as part of B-I-F'
quotation No. 871-40906-4-532 from J. Henry Jones
Company, Inc." (Pl. Ex. 3 and 3A) The cover letter
was attached to these quotations. The latter, however, did not itemize the price of each item of equipment. At the bottom of the cover letter retained by
Smith, Smith wrote "All for a total of $40,969 ;"and
on the copy retained by Jones, Jones wrote "Total
$40,969."
At the trial Smith claimed for the first time that
he intended the above figure to include sales tax.
Jones claimed the figure was a basic price only and
that the sales tax had not been computed nor added to
this figure because it was expected that the purchaser may provide an exemption certificate acceptable
to the State Tax Commission as provided in the terms
and conditions of the sale. (PL Ex. 3A) Smith made
2

rn• c,bjertions to the printed matter attached to the
cn\er letter at the time of signing. The printed pa1ts
of the contract in question read as follows:
''PHICES
The amount of any applicable present or future tax 01· other government charge upon the
p1 oduction, sale, shipment and/or use of the
covered by this quotation shall be added
1o billing -vvhe1 e applicable unless Purchaser
provides us with an exemption certificate acceptable to the taxing authorities . "
DELIVERY
"] n no event shall the Company be liable for

consequential damages resulting from its failure to perform or delays in performing its obligations unless otherwise agreed in writing
by an authorized Company officer."
Except for the first three paragraphs of Appellent's statement of facts, the remainder thereof appeai·s to be largely conclusions of the Appellant but
1rhich were not accepted as facts by the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
THE APPELLANT WAS OBLIGATED TO PAY
THE SALES TAX, AND WHE'THER OR NOT

A TAX EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE COULD
HA VE BEEN OBTAINED WAS NOT IN ISSUE.

"Thether or not Smith could actually qualify to
obtain a tax exemption certificate was not an issue
in this case. The Tax Commission would have had to
3

determine whethe1· or not the equipment purchaser!
retained its character as tangible personal propertv
and did not become real property upon installation
and to otherwise determine if Srni th qualified for 3
tax exemption certificate. The Trial Court's statement that he could have obtained the same is mere
dictum in the case at bar. The Trial Court stateo th:·
issue on this point as follows: "l. \Vhether the Defendant is liable for sales tax in the sum of $1,433.92
because of failure to provide an exeniption certificate
as provided for in the printed portion of the contract
in question." ( R 7 0) (emphasis added)
The printed portion of the contract required the
tax to be paid unless an exemption certificate was
furnished. Admittedly, none was furnished; and
there was no evidence that a request for one had been
made to the Tax Commission.
In the case of Utah Concrete Products vs. Tm·
Coni1nission, 101 U. 513; 125 P. 2d 408, the Trial
Court rejected Plaintiff's argument that road contractors were only instrumentalities of the state and
as such were entitled to an exemption. In this case
cited by Appellant the issue was whether "road contractors were only instrumentalities of the state and
as such exempt under Section 6." The Court properly
held that the contractor was liable for the tax.
4

nESPOl·TSE TO APPELLANT'S POINT II
TILE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
TIIE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
INDICATED THE STATED CONTilACT PRICE
DID NOT INCLUDE THE SALES TAX.

The T1·ial Court's ruling that the contract price
1llcl not include the sales tax was based upon its
weighing all of the evidence, the testimony, and con::;idPring the circumstances as a trie1· of the facts. The
Trial Court properly concluded "Defendant Smith's
claim that the language 'All for a total of $40,969'
(which he endorsed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), means
that said figure included the sales tax is not tenable.
In the Court's view, such figure constituted the basic
price; and in the absence of language showing that it
mcluded sales tax, it is not to be so interpreted." (R
71) On this issue the Court was acting as a jury to
cleterrnine the intention of the parties and had the
advantage of passing upon the credibility and the demeanor of the witnesses in the assertion of their conflicting claims.
The case of Butler vs. State Tax Comission,
Hl62, 13 U. 2d. 1; 367 P. 2d 852, very closely resembles the case at bar. In that case the contractor in, stalled equipment furnished by B-I-F and Jones, in
the Salt Lake water treatment plant. Butler claimed
he intended the bid price to pay for all costs including any taxes imposed based on " ... for the lump
sum amount of $650,350." Also, evidence was offered to show that he may have been entitled to an ex-

eption from the use tax because of taxes having been
paid in another jurisdiction. In that case, the Tax
Commission had the duty of determining the facts.
This Court held :
"Where a taxpayer asserted that a transaction
was exempted from the use tax under Sec. (d)
15-16-4, but the only representation the taxpayer offered to make was that it intended its
bid price to pay for all costs to it, including
any taxes imposed, and which may have been
paid elsewhere, it was not reversible error for
the Commission to exclude the proffered evidence."
The Utah Supreme Court further stated the law
in the following language which should now be applied to our case and could be the basis of disposing
of the appeal:
"Where the evidence is in conflict and/ or it's
such that different inferences may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, the Tax Commission
must be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in performing its duty in determining
the facts; and this Court will not disturbe its
conclusions unless they appear to be clearly
erroneous . . ."
The same rule of law was previously state by
unanimous decision of this Court in the case of McKen.drick vs. State Tax Com1nission, 1959, 9 U. 2d.
418; 347 P. 2d. 177.
A trial judge is frequently better qualified that
a jury or even the Tax Commission in weighing conflicting evidence, and in the case at bar this not only
6

applies to the sales taxes but the claimed damages
for alleged late delivery.
Although the following two cases also refer to
delayed deliveries, the question of weighing the evidence by the trier of the facts is also presented.
It has been held "that the acceptance of goods

after the time fixed for delivery may be considered
by the jury as evidence of a waiver of damages sustained by the delay, but its weight must depend upon
the circumstances of the case." M edart Patent Pulley
vs. Dubuque, 96 NW 770.

The Court held in Mitrmann vs. Wissler, 92 SW
355 : "That acceptance after the expiration of the
time for delivery is but prima facie evidence of a
waiver of a right to damages on account of the delay,
and the question of waiver is in general for the jury."
In the Montague case cited on page 7 of Appellant's brief, there was clearly a counteroffer. This
was not true in the case at bar. The case is further
distinguished by the Court's stating, "The only reasonable construction that could be placed upon the
counter offer imder the circumstances was that sales
tax would be included in the contract price ... " (empahis added)
The quotation taken from the Loeb case quoted
on page 8 of Appellant's brief appears to be taken
out of context.
The Court further stated in that case, NQur con7

clusion is that the contractor as a purchaser of the
materials used in the carrying out of his contract
must pay the sales taxes due on those purchases and'
that if it was his purpose to pass those taxes on to the
Defendant [consumer] here, he should have so stated
in the con tract."
The Jones-Smith contract conditionally stated
that the purchaser was to pay the taxes.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED'THAT
THE PRINTED MATTER SETTING FORTH
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE
SALE TOGETHER WITH THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT WAS A PART OF THE PURCHASE
CONTRACT.

The Trial Court made its ruling in this case on
on the basis that the printed portion itemizing the
conditions were part of the contract. This was an important part of the contract as indicated in bold print
at the bottom of the first page which reads "IMPORT ANT READ CAREFULLY." (Pl. Ex. 3A) The
first sentence in Smith's cover letter indicates the
in ten ti on of the parties in this language: "This is to
be included as part of B-I-F quotation No. 871-409064-532 from J. Henry Jones, Inc." (Pl. Ex. 3A) The
printed matter contains the "STANDARD TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF SALE."
The Appellant's contention that the printed matter was only the terms of a contract between B-1-F
and Jones ignores the fact Smith took advantage of
8

inany of the printed terms and conditions. He made
proi·ata payments as partial shipments were made.

comp1·essor was returned, and Smith took adrc-;11tage of the warranty as pertaining to the pumps .
.A factory-trained serviceman was used although the
printing was enlarged by the typed portion. ( T 62)
The f•vidence and circumstances all justified the Trial
Courfs conclusion that the printed matter was a part
of t11c Smith-Jones contract.
The printed matter together with the description of the equipment was directed to the city of Blanding and the City's project engineers and passed on
to Smith prior to the signing of the Smith-Jones cover lette1· which was expressly "to be included as a
part of the B-I-F quotation." Regardless of relations
between B-I-F and Jones, the printed matter was intended and accepted as a part of the terms without
further discussions or objection. ( T 32)
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURTPROPERLY HELD THAT
THE CONTRACT PRECLUDED DAM AGES
FOR LA TE DELIVERIES AND SECONDLY
THAT 'THERE WAS A SEASONABLE PERFORMANCE WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY APPELLANT WITHOUT OBJECTrON-INDICATING A WAIVER.

It is significant that the Trial Court prefaced
its reasons for not allowing Defendant's claimed setoff for late deliveries by saying, ''The Court finds
from a perponderance of the evidence that Defendant
is not entitled to a setoff by reason of late deliveries
9

of purchased equipment ... " ( R 75) (emphasis added)
Appellant's quotation from 46 Am. Jur. l!7
qualifies the application to the case at bar and cleai:lr
indicates that it does not apply because of the fo1lm;
ing language: " ... fails to deliver at the tin1e stipulated, therefore, in the contract ... " and further
limits the rule as is pertains to the case at bar \Yith
this language: " ... in the absence of evfr1ence of (lny
facts or circunistances ... " (emphasis added). In
the case now before the Court there were no deliver::
dates agreed to, and there were facts and circumstances showing seasonable performance. ( R 72 J
The parties stipulated that where a contract is
made to deliver goods and no date is specified that
the law implies that it will be within a reasonable
time. ( T 42) Reasonable time is a question of fact
the Trial Court found in favor of Jones from a preponderance of the evidence. The Trial Court was vei'Y
liberal in considering Defendant's theory and 1vas
certainly aware of its own duty to determine whether
or not the claimed offsets "are justifiable and allowable." (T 108-T 109)
The rule is stated in 17 C.J.S. 1067-1068 and
the several cases cited as to what constitutes reasonable time for performance of a contract which states
no time:
"Generally, reasonable time depends upon t?e
nature of the con tract and the particular ell'10

cumstances - taking into consideration the
difficulties attending it and the diligence
used." (Rosewell Drainage District vs. Dickey,
292 Fed. 29, 32)
'·In deciding whethe1· an undertaking has been
performed within a reasonable time the material difficulties and hazards attending it,
the amount of diligence used, the frustrated
attempts of performance should be considered." (City of East Liverpool, Ohio vs. Pitt
Construction Cornpany, 28 Fed. 236, 239; Dennison vs. Ladd, 54 Nev. 186; 10 P.2d)
Davis vs Fish, 48 Am. Dec. 387. Holding that
the acceptance and use of property purchased by executory contract furnished strong presumption of a
waiver of all objections on account of delay in delivery. V\Thether or not there was a waiver is ordinarily
a question of intention and, therefore, a question of
fact.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT C 0 RR EC TL Y RULED
THAT INTEREST SHOULD BE COMPUTED
FROM DATES OF SHIPMENT BASED ON THE
UNDISPUTED SCHEDULED SHIPMENT
DATES BUT THAT INTEREST SHOULD NOT
BE COMPOUNDED.

The evidence set forth the scheduled shipping
dates. (Def. Ex. 5) The con tract provides under the
paragraph PAYMENTS: "Prorata payments shall
become due as any partial shipments are made." (Pl.
Ex. 3A and R 72) The evidence also showed invoice
billings and credited installments. (Pl. Ex. 4) Jones
11

testified about the correlation of interest charges
with debits and the invoices for payments due as
shown by his financial records and shipping schedule.
(T 47)

There was some question at the trial as to whether or not the interest w::i.s being compounded, and
at the conclusion of the trial Jones was ordered to
submit a detailed computation of simple interest. (R
73) In complying, Jones listed the shipping dates
from copies of the invoices which he testified Smith
had received. These are reasonably consistent with
the schedule, and the Court set this forth in its findings of fact. (R. 76, 77, 78) It is to be noted that all
of these dates were prior to November 1, 1964.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court impartially and judiciously discharged its responsibility as the trier of the facts and
the law. It was proper that the purchaser should be
required to pay the sales tax. The contract did not
specify delivery dates but expressly precluded damages for late deliveries. Deliveries of equipment made
after the completion date set forth in the primary
construction contract and not mentioned in the subcon tract were made within a reasonable time. The
purchaser should pay simple interest on the amounts
found to be unpaid.
12

Respondent, J. Henry Jones Co., respectfully
asks this Honorable Court to uphold the decision of
the District Court.
Respecifully submitted,
GEORGE C. MORRIS
914 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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